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Abstract
Inspired by philosophical ideas of Boltzmann, which are briefly recalled, we provide strong sup-
port for the possibility and convenience of a realistic world picture, properly nuanced. The argu-
ments have consequences for the interpretation of quantum mechanics, and for relevant concepts
of quantum field and string theory, like monopoles and branes. Our view is illustrated with a
cybernetic analogy and complemented with a summary of the basic philosophical concepts.
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I. INTRODUCTION
It is common in the Physics literature to find more or less involved statements on the
existence of the basic objects and of their representations. Relevant examples today may be
strings or branes, as atoms and quarks were in the past. As a practical or more conscious
attitude, the positions range from two extremes. On one side, existence is granted or denied
to the items if they can be detected (like atoms or quarks) or disproved, like the ether
or the planet Vulcan, without further thoughts about the reality of their mathematical
representative. In the other extreme [1] existence is assigned even to the representations
themselves, with varying degrees of commitment to the philosophical concepts.
In a way this parallels the extremes of the oldest philosophical debate, between rational-
ists and empiricists, the most radical forms of which are naive realism and constructivism.
Practitioners of physics are usually closer to the former view. Nevertheless one cannot al-
ways ignore the philosophical background, and certainly not concerning the foundations of
quantum mechanics, where the interpretation, which is a basic ingredient, has always been
a matter of debate, often called the problem of realism. This debate can have also practical
implications e.g. for quantum information or quantum cosmology. In any case, thinking
about these abstract matters certainly opens our vision and improves our questions and
understanding.
Our purpose is to provide a clear and simple conceptual (philosophical) picture of these
important questions, which could also be useful in practice, clean of technicalities. Our view
was mainly built thinking about the philosophical ideas of Boltzmann. They are contained
in his only specific technical article [2], which is both long and hard to read, in his notes for
the Philosophy lectures held by Boltzmann in his last years [3], which are even harder, and
also informally scattered in his Popular Writings and other popularizations, which are very
rewarding [4].
In the next section II we address the main problem of the existence of the physical
world and its description, beginning with a historical perspective to provide a selection of
Boltzmann’s ideas, and we reassure the reader immediately with the basic conclusion, that
one can safely maintain a realistic position on the objective existence of the external world, in
permanent evolution, adjusted and regulated by experimental confrontation. In Boltzmann’s
words “we must adopt the objective point of view”, as the phrase goes.[2]. This will lead
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us to our main proposal, to call existing or non existing only what is detectable or falsable
respectively. As for the different concepts, at various levels of complexity and abstraction, for
which neither option can be achieved at present, one should distinguish between the physics
approach with mathematical analysis and measurements, and the philosophical reasoning,
involving qualitative attributes which can be related to existence. Interesting examples of the
former are entanglement or virtualities, and of the later unavoidability, which is discussed
in Section III. There we apply these ideas to specific concepts of quantum field theory,
string theory and cosmology, like monopoles and branes and to the general problem of the
interpretation of quantum mechanics. Section IV summarizes the conclusions and outlook.
In Appendix 1 we illustrate the mental representations with a model analogy from neural
networks and programming languages.We include another Appendix 2 to explain in a concise
way the philosophical background, relevant for our arguments and beyond.
II. THE GENERAL PROBLEM OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE EXTERNAL
WORLD
To put the problem in a useful historical perspective, we remind that Boltzmann, who
had based the (mechanical) understanding of thermodynamics on atoms, had to discuss and
defend them frequently against the radical philosophical positivism as well as against extreme
phenomenological theorists. The present work is in part an attempt to make more accessible
his ideas and to start applying them to present physics. The first point of Boltzmann
Philosophy was the necessity to define clearly the concepts discussed and in fact this is
how his purely philosophical work begins and ends, illustrated with examples and personal
anecdotes. This claim for clarity is a constant in his writings, urging to prevent the perverse
antinomies of philosophy.This will be present in the discussion on the existence now and we
shall keep it in mind in the applications below, especially to the interpretation of quantum
mechanics.
In his article Boltzmann goes immediately after this introduction to describe the process
of human perception of the external world, starting from the observation[22] that the laws
according to which our own perceptions run their course are familiar to us and lie ready in the
memory. By attaching these same pictures also to the perceptual complexes that define the
bodies of others, we obtain the simplest description of these complexes. This is elaborated
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further arguing that in the extreme idealistic position the sensations and volitions of all
others could not be on the same level as the sensations of the observer, but would have to
be taken as merely expressing the equations between his own sensations. The idea is stated
more clearly in the next page: Therefore we designate these alien perceptions with analogous
mental signs and words to those for our own, because this gives a good picture of the course of
many complexes of sensations and this simplifies the world picture. For clarity and economy,
Boltzmann claims after another couple of pages that we must adopt the “objective point of
view”, as the phrase goes. It turns out that the concepts we linked with “existing” and
“non existing” largely remain applicable unchanged. Those people or inanimate things that I
merely imagine without being forced to do so by the regularities in complexes of perceptions
do not exist for others, they are “objectively” non-existing.
The main conclusion of this line of thought, based largely on the common judgement of
all, implies in (our) in simple terms, that one can maintain a realistic position, assuming
the objective existence of the physical world, in a reasonable degree of agreement with our
representations thereof, which are sufficiently universal and which may evolve as required by
the experimental confrontation and of course by our own evolution, an essential ingredient
of Boltzmann Philosophy. For instance he wrote: The brain we view as the apparatus or
organ for producing world views, an organ which because of the great utility of these views
for the preservation of the species has, conformably, with Darwin’s theory, developed in a
man to a degree of particular perfection just as the neck in the giraffe and the bill in the
stork have developed to an unusual length [2].
Let us explain briefly the argument, which being philosophical, has to use logic starting,
of course, from our mental representations, the concepts. We recognize them and decide
whether they are relevant or not from confrontation with the representations of others. But
those are also external objects, so that any statement and mental construction is actually
based on the external world, as represented with enough degree of fidelity and universality by
our concepts. The adequacy or correspondence of the reasonably universal representations
(concepts) is based on confrontation and guaranteed by evolution, which also renders the
process dynamical (over large time scales). Therefore it would be inconsistent to deny the
reality of the external world. Notice that one has not proved its existence, but the absurdity
of the attempts to disprove it, thereby establishing the possibility and convenience of an
objective world picture.
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Boltzmann uses then an ingenious argument to maintain this universal realism for any
kind of brain process and beyond, applying these reasoning successively to simpler and
simpler organisms, reaching the virus and molecular levels, until confrontation or detection
is generalized to interactions. Our starting point, the mental processes, beginning with
the primary physical inputs, which are later elaborated in different degrees of robustness
and complexity, yielding the representations with varying degrees of fidelity and universality,
should become ultimately also a question of bio-physical interactions. But for our philosoph-
ical arguments suffice to say in that respect that the agreement between nature and reason
is because reason is natural and not the opposite. In Appendix1 we provide a cybernetic
analogy of the cognitive process, which can be useful.
In any case, from the arguments so far, i.e. from clear conceptions, rigour and logic,
one has established the possibility of an ”objective” world view, and the convenience of this
representation, provided it is sufficiently contrasted and updated. This point of view can be
seen a golden middle between the two extreme positions, as illustrated in Appendix2.
This leads further to propose, that we call existent only those representations which,
clearly defined, are physically realizable and detectable (in principle with some energy trans-
fer [5]). A consequence is that there is no place for gradations in this clear, but restricted
notion of existence: representations which fulfil it correspond to existing objects, like atoms
or neutron stars, while those which do not, should not be called existing. This notion of
existence has many advantages, like a highest degree of universality. The assumption of
different degrees of existence would be decidedly inappropriate as Boltzmann says, and the
denotation must always be so chosen that we can operate with the same concepts in the same
way under all circumstances, just as a mathematician defines negative or fractional expo-
nents in such a way that he can operate with them as with integral ones [23]. This avoids
confusions, like most of the dreadful antinomies of philosophy, but it also rises the following
problem.
There are concepts which can be clearly disproved, like ether or the planet Vulcan. But
for many ideas one is not able, at least for different time periods, to detect or disprove them
as defined. What can then be said about such useful representations, with respect to the
external world? We have to address the problem, because as we said, any statement of any
kind involves the representations.
This marks a line between a physics approach, where one has to look for a verification or
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falsification, and the philosophical, where one can envisage attributes,which can be related to
existence more or less directly on the one hand, but which have the possibility of qualitative,
more or less coarse gradations, on the other. They can be vague, like clarity, simplicity or
beauty, or very sharp, like (in)dispensability, which is discussed in the next section at length
because of his potential relevance.
A first consequence of this is the great convenience of distinguishing in physics between
qualitative concepts, but which are ultimately philosophical interpretations, from genuine
physical proposals, always falsable in a way or another. Textbook examples are many of the
different proposals to render quantum mechanics complete or more understandable, which
will be discussed in III B. There is of course place in Physics for useful qualitative discussions,
even in our restrictive philosophical view, as we discuss next.
III. A PHILOSOPHICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE EXISTENCE IN PHYSICS
A. The unavoidable attributes related to existence
One of the simplest and useful examples of such general predicates related to existence
can be indispensability ( or the closely related concept of unavoidability), introduced by
Boltzmann less formally for the concept of the atom in his popular writings. They are not
present in his technical technical publication, and so their analysis below, is (needless to
say!), essentially ours.
Boltzmann argued in his talks and popular writings, that his ideal atoms were, not only
useful, but indispensable. They became of course properly existing after Einstein computed
(following Boltzmann’s prescription for fluctuations) the observed Brownian motion of pollen
and made predictions confirmed later by Perrin [6]. At this level the concept of atoms
was defined simply as elementary grains of matter. Of course concepts have to be defined
precisely, and that of atom was finely sharpened later. More specifically, they are represented
by complex functions, solutions of linear differential equation (Schro¨dinger’s), which in turn
can be combined, enlarging at will their potential manifestations, as discussed in III B.
To illustrate this further let us use the concept of gen, similar in some ways to the atom.
With a very general definition, as units of transmittable information, one can of course call
them existing, after their molecular structure was found in 1953, but in hindsight one could
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have shown them to be unavoidable, at least since W. Sutton named them in 1922 as the
Mendelian units of transmission. Life is even more difficult to define than gen, but we think
it should not be difficult to show it to be unavoidable under rather general conditions. As
for conscious life, it seems to us almost hopeless at present to define and accordingly much
more difficult to argue its unavoidability, as Drake “equation” shows.
Notice the subtle difference between indispensability (Unentbehrlichkeit), which refers
to the object → concept direction, the “easy way” according to Boltzmann, and avoidable
(Vermeidlich in German or evitabile in Latin languages) more related to the concept → ob-
ject direction, which is harder the more complex the concept, as is clear and it is illustrated
in Appendix2. This admittedly exaggerated subtlety, can nevertheless illustrate the impos-
sibility of a perfect one to one correspondence between concepts and the external world, as
we shall see is required by some attempts to make quantum mechanics “complete”.
Still in biology let us remind of another example given by Boltzmann for non existent
concepts in the philosophical article: the unicorn. It turns out that today one can speak of
the realizability of such a concept, and in fact it has been done already, e.g. with drosophila
flies. It seems on the other hand unlikely to be neither unavoidable from evolution, which
is difficult anyway, nor at least stable under it. This can illustrate the role of evolution in
the notion of existence as stated above, and of the relevance of dispensability.
Another interesting example, back to physics, is the concept of the electromagnetic field,
(missed by Boltzmann). Of course the concept of electric andmagnetic fields, became almost
unavoidable after Hertz discovery, and certainly with the disproof of ether. But after the
success of quantum gauge theory the concept of electromagnetic field, the vector potential,
is clearly unavoidable. This shows the new level one reaches when a concept is defined in
terms of mathematically deeper theories, as the fundamental interactions and constituents.
Our next discussion involves in fact concepts, monopoles and branes, which are expressed
mathematically, with higher degrees of abstraction and complexity. Of course the first
question in physics is whether the objects can be realized, or detected, i.e. registered in
processes involving some energy transfer and which can be reproduced. The properly defined
concept will correspond in that case, and only in that case, to an existing object, or, shortly,
exists (in the sense of the definition). Until this can be achieved one can discuss questions
as how fundamental or effective is the corresponding mathematical theory, but one can also
make progress from a more philosophical point of view as the analysis of the attribute of
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indispensability, applied to the following relevant examples shows.
The concept of monopoles corresponds to the sources of the magnetic field, i.e. magnetic
charges. They were shown by Dirac to be a way of implementing discreteness of the electric
charge, which requires regularization of singularities and conservation of symmetries. Its
existence has not been proven so far, although there is a more recent claim in condensed
matter physics experiments, with a special composite called spin ice [7]. It is a matter of
debate at present as to whether these objects fulfil the requirements of the general class
required for discrete charges. On the other hand there are arguments in favour of the in-
dispensability of monopoles: fundamental theories with compact (gauge) phase symmetries,
the so called grand unified, imply trivial discreteness of charge, but at the same time, they
also predict monopoles. Grand Unification of interactions could be established soon. In fact
neutrino masses provide a good hint. This example also shows the importance to consider,
as mentioned above, how fundamental is an object, distinguishing monopoles as extended
solutions of a fundamental theory from those aggregates of particles combined in atoms,
molecules, and further structures.
As the name indicates, the concept of brane [8] refers to extended objects in spatial and
temporal directions, introduced or appearing in some string and gravity theories. They are
useful for combining gauge fields and gravity at the quantum level, at least in some ap-
proximations, and in cosmology. They serve so far an auxiliary role. To decide about their
existence one has to consider their energy (or density) and propagation. In fact they provide
a way to implement energy conservation for the strings, which mediate their interactions, to
make particles or even the universe. Direct observable consequences, to decide if they exist
(in a specified class) are very difficult (for instance, there have been proposals for special
gravitational waves). Alternatively, one could consider if they are unavoidable from their
ability to change the rate of expansion, at present and in the past (inflation). But these
are not so well understood [9]. So, in contrast to the case of monopoles, we could have to
wait very long to decide about the existence of branes and even about their indispensability.
Therefore, it would be convenient on occasion to keep this in mind speaking, or writing
about these most interesting concepts. Another conclusion of this section is that although
indispensability or unavoidability are at another level (philosophical) than the physical ex-
istence, which requires experimental confirmation or falsification, they can be useful even in
physics. Besides, they are more flexible and admit with full right loose gradations as almost
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or the celebrated for practical purposes. From a formal point of view, they could be seen as
a much weaker form than the mathematical attribute necessary, as is appropriate in Physics
where experiments ultimately decide.
B. Interpretation of Quantum mechanics
In quantum mechanics one incorporates the representation from the beginning which
may be one of the reasons for its astonishing performances. One works in fact at the level
of representations without actual reference to the external world until measurement. These
representations are complex ”wave” functions, which can be superposed with the interference
properties of waves. Our proposal requires not to call these representations existing until
they have been realized in a detectable way, with a probability given of course by the
norm of the combined function. This way one keeps a universal meaning of the concept
and avoids the potential confusion of many interpretations which have been proposed to
cope with the apparent conceptual difficulties of quantum mechanics. These are mainly the
essential probabilistic nature of the description (“stochastic unit samples”), the mechanism
and the nature of the transition from an uncertain or fluctuating state to the robust and
certain measurement result ( “collapse and decoherence”). Interpretations which in a more
or less subtle way attribute existence to the representations, the wave functions and their
combinations, or to additional auxiliary functions, are explained in many excellent textbooks
[10]. Well known examples are the many worlds of Everett, Hartle’s consistent histories and
the pilot waves of Bohm. It is important to remember there is no way to detect or falsify
those interpretations, so we are in fact at the philosophical level, where the relevant question
should be whether these auxiliary objects, worlds or paths, are unavoidable. The answer is
clearly they are not, rather the opposite, a view shared by many of the active researchers
using those fundamental aspects of quantum mechanics, like A. Zeilinger [11]. In fact, it is
natural to accept limitations to common sense imposed by physics, as it happened before
with simultaneity or with indistinguishability.
This illustrates the usefulness of our simple proposal, but we do not claim that the sit-
uation is completely satisfactory. The question whether quantum mechanics is a complete
theory is alive since Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen posed it [12]. One has to define complete-
ness, and of course they did: every element of physical reality should have a counterpart in
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the physical theory. This strong requirement is very difficult to meet, as we have seen from
the discussion on the cognitive process. In fact, trying to complete the theory to meet the
above difficulties one has to cope with very restrictive theorems about the implications of
adding new ”hidden” variables [13], under very reasonable general conditions, which have
been always experimentally confirmed in favour of pure quantum mechanics. There are even
stronger theorems limiting the possibility of such extension from internal consistency [14].
There are partial but promising solutions to the last of the basic mentioned problems,
decoherence [15], but it is clearly beyond the scope and space limits of this article to enter
into details of these well defined physics. Let us remind instead that there are in fact other
reasons for insatisfaction beyond these conceptual problems, especially in the relativistic
extensions, where infinities appear in the perturbative solutions. These divergences are
under control, and some even well understood, which is not the case for the extension to
gravitational interactions. Also there are many basic problems related to strong interactions
defying solution for decades, like the confinement of quarks.This is seen by some as a need
to reformulate the foundations, with new physics [10, 16], which would be interesting to
study in our framework. From the simple concept of existence point of view, there are
well defined physics notions to measure virtualities and quantum entanglements. Let us
comment briefly on a special one [17]. It is based on the worldline or proper time formulation
of quantum mechanics, due to Fock, Schwinger, and Feynman. There, one parameterizes
quantum amplitudes with an auxiliary parameter called proper time, which controls the
fluctuations of the quantum state in spacetime, and are represented as a path integral in that
auxiliary space. After some manipulations, the integrals can be computed by combination
of numerical and analytical methods, and the fluctuations visualized. The virtuality of the
process is related to different random walks, more or less directed, which in turn can be
put in correspondence with a Hausdorff dimension, 2 in the extreme quantum or 1 in the
the classical regime. This is to illustrate that there are concepts, like virtualities, which can
be further analysed with our philosophy proposals and which could help understanding and
even visualizing the physics problem.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS
Building on Boltzmann philosophical ideas, briefly recalled, we have given arguments
based on general concepts and logic, strongly supporting the possibility and the convenience
of maintaining the objective existence of physics processes. They imply in turn to restrict
that existence to concepts which can have a clear manifestation. For concepts which one
is not able for the moment to submit to such a requirement, the philosophical analysis
can make useful contributions, with attributes related to existence. We elaborated the
simple examples of unavoidability and its reverse. They were first illustrated with historical
interesting examples of atoms, fields, and even gens and life and then applied in some detail
to relevant concepts at present like monopoles and branes. In quantum mechanics, they
provide a clarification and criticism of popular interpretations. More involved analysis have
been suggested for future research, in a fruitful interplay of physics and philosophy. We hope
that our presentation is not perceived as an over-simplification, a possibility we assumed in
the spirit of the practical and direct form Boltzmann declared indispensable for philosophical
argumentations.
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V. APPENDIX1:BASIC PICTURE OF THOUGHT WITH CYBERNETICS
ANALOGY
Our arguments started from the basics of the cognitive process, where a physical input
triggers a primary signal, which is later processed into a memory or commemorative record-
ings of various degrees of complexity, the concepts, involving neural networks in specific
areas in the brain. They are decanted trough permanent confrontation with the external
world and those of others, as explained, and become ideas at various degrees of abstraction
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and distance from the primary trigger [18]. This basic conception (and logic) is what has
been used for the argument supporting an objective world picture, in which those represen-
tations, the concepts, can be appropriately said to correspond to existing objects, provided
they are detected, or not, if experimentally disproved.
The human brain produces general frames abstracting relevant properties of objects, the
languages, consisting of words, syntax, and meaning, of different levels of abstraction and,
correspondingly, of retroprojectivity to the external objects. The main areas and processes
involved are becoming known, but of course there is a long way to go to master the codes,
and it is even an open question whether the whole process can be controlled in a relevant
way. Besides, we are aware of the key role of chemistry in the brains functions! But for our
philosophical reasoning here we only need the general concept, which can illustrated with a
neural network analogy.
In neural networks, one has a first layer of devices (neurons) receiving an input. This in
turn triggers an output from different numbers of neurons to the next layers, with different
weights. Combining outputs, simple functions (say tanh) connecting two values (on-off) one
can produce complicated functions, which will implement effective operations, like recog-
nising voices or pictures. In terms of computers these simple functions could correspond
to machine languages. But one has also object oriented languages, like C++, where one
works with abstract functions (for instance, templates), and can operate with them. In our
analogy, these correspond to more abstract and general languages, the most universal of
which is mathematics.
Let us look at the concept of pair. In the first case, in machine related language, one
has pairs of concrete objects (integers, for example), which allow in turn for operations like
permutations or orderings. In the second more advanced case, templates provide abstract
pairs which can in turn be paired or otherwise operated successively, including combinations
with other objects. In the neural network this could correspond to nonplanar and transverse
connections, which, require a much larger size and plasticity, like in parallel vector networks,
as indicated schematically in Fig.1
a)
b)
FIG. 1: Schematic representation of a neural network. The input passing through simple functions
like (a) is transformed into the output (b). In blue (dashed lines) a possible transversal and reverse
connection is shown.
VI. APPENDIX2: PHILOSOPHY BACKGROUND
As our main conclusion can be seen as a compromise between empiricism and idealism,
we explain these basic philosophical ideas and terminology, condensed and simplified, using
physical examples.
Kant is a standard reference [20] and for good reason, as mathematics and physics were
his starting point, and it is the first manifestly critical approach to the theory of knowledge.
His position was the first reasonably, partially realistic one. In the old debate of empiricism,
denying reality of ideas and the external world and rationalism, assigning it to both of
them, Kant’s proposal is a middle solution: he did not grant general existence to ideas but
he defended some existence of the sensorial world. Boltzmann’s position can be seen as a big
step forward in this direction, with a sound scientific basis, including evolution and opening
it to future progress.
Back in 1781 [21], Kant noticed that statements can be analytical (e.g. the electrons
with up or down spin directions in a factorized tensor product state) or synthetical (e.g. the
electrons in a symmetrized coupled (entangled) state with a given total spin, 0 or 1 ). More
schematically:“a is in ab” is analytical while “c is in ab”is synthetical.
All empirical (called a posteriori) statements are synthetical (experience always teaches),
but the opposite is not true, not all synthetic statements are empirical: there are some
statements with new properties in addition to the premises (synthetic) which are true in-
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dependent of empirical experience (a priori). This simple scheme was thought to apply to
mathematics and even some concepts of physics but it has been generalized (and relativized)
by modern Philosophy of Science.
A proper analysis is also the task of neuroscience and the theory of knowledge as discussed,
but as a philosopher Kant argued that there are preconditions in humans, such as time and
space, which universally allow such processes. Of course Kant, a devoted Newtonian who
had himself worked out the notion of galaxies, took time and space as universal and absolute,
as well as other necessary ingredients of thought called categories. They are fundamental
ideas like causality, which had been around from the beginning of Philosophy and ordered
by Aristotle. Needless to say that those absolute notions were naive, and wrong in strict
terms, but the framework was adequate for scientific discussions and the seed for the later
developments. It is worth reminding ourselves that Boltzmann who proposed a big step
forward, facing the ontological problem [3], warned against absolute use of “laws of thought”
like causality, which we may denote either a precondition of all experience or as itself an
experience we have in conjunction with every other experience[2]. He also warned frequently
that in the realm of explanations, models and theories could be also useful, even if apparently
wrong.
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